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SESSION TWO
RISK IN THE AIR AND THE MYTH OF FAULT
By PETER H.

SANDt

I. INTRODUCTION

L

ET ME START with a story which, though related to my current
teaching assignment in Africa, is certainly quite unrelated to our

present subject.
There is an ancient legal custom in Ethiopia, which is in theory abolished

by the new codes, but which you can still observe in operation in many
country villages: When a crime or a tort has been committed for which
no culprit can be found, the village chief may call the entire population
for a hearing called "afersata." All the villagers abandon their work and,
for a day or two, gather under the judgment-tree for a public inquisition
during which everybody is questioned. If, at the end of the meeting, no
culprit has been found, the community as a whole shares the damage and

compensates the victim.
This, as I said, is a very ancient custom. Life is beginning to change
in the Ethiopian village, too; and I personally know of one village chief
who faces a serious financial problem every year. With a very backward
tax system on the one hand, and growing expenses for the village school,
roads, water supply and sanitation on the other, he winds up
with a chronic deficit in the village budget. So what does he do? Every
year at the beginning of the rainy season, he announces that the village
treasury has been stolen by an unknown thief. An "afersata" is called;
the day of inquisition passes, with no culprit found; - and as soon as the
sun sets, the villagers get up from under the tree and grudgingly pay
their share for the "loss," to cover the community deficit. Mind you, none
of them is fooling himself, and they all know perfectly well that there
just is no individual "culprit" for this "damage." But they prefer to
look for a wrong-doer, because that is the way it was always done, and
that is the law as they know it.
This African story, I repeat, is quite unrelated to my present subjectexcept to show, perhaps, the tenacity with which some people cling to a
legal institution long after it ceased to fit the social and economic conditions of the jet age.
This brings me to my subject: viz, the venerable dogma of "fault
liability" in air law, and the allegedly radical departure from the dogma
in the Montreal Agreement of May 1966.
To begin with, it is not quite correct to say that the Montreal Agreement has "abandoned" the concept of fault in favor of "absolute liability."
True, the airlines have waived their defenses, up to the new limits of
t

Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Haile Sellassie I University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
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liability: but above these limits they remain free to raise the old "nofault" excuse, requiring the plaintiff to prove either negligence (in accidents not covered by the Warsaw Convention) or "wilful misconduct,"
the aggravated negligence of Article 25 of the Convention. This practically
amounts to what is called a "two-level system of liability" in the jargon
of traffic accident compensation plans:' namely, automatic but limited
compensation to all victims, plus unlimited compensation to victims who
can establish an aggravated-fault basis for recovery.
The issue here, therefore, is not "fault liability vs. strict liability." The
question now before us rather is: Does the "two-level system of liability"
set up by the Montreal Agreement take a rational approach to contemporary air accident law, and does it offer a realistic basis for a new agreement
in the future-for a step forward from the Warsaw Convention?
It is indeed difficult to see what should be so radical or "revolutionary"
about this new system. Those who call it revolutionary presumably start
from one or several of the following three premises: from the old Warsaw
Convention of 1929-1955; or from the actual compensation practice of
air carriers prior to the Montreal Agreement; or from contemporary legal
theory regarding accident compensation. (I deliberately omit those critics
who start from the simple premise that the system is different from American law, for that does not strike me as a very rational approach to international agreements).
Here, then, are what I consider as the three main areas for discussion
of the new liability system, and-in order to simplify matters for the
purpose of disagreement-here are my own positions:
1. Is the two-level liability system of the Montreal Agreement radically
out of step with the original Warsaw Convention? I submit that it is not.
2. Is the two-level system radically out of step with current practice in
aviation claims settlement and insurance? I submit that it is not.
3. Is this new system radically out of step with contemporary legal
thinking, both here and abroad, in the field of accident compensation in
general and automobile plans in particular? Again I submit that it is not,
and I shall now proceed to reformulate and to illustrate my three contentions.
II. QUESTION

ONE

Question No. 1: Can the new system of liability be fitted in the framework of the Warsaw Convention as it was conceived thirty-eight years
ago and as it was handed down to us?
Sir William Hildred has compared the Convention to an old English
country mansion, suggesting that instead of rebuilding it entirely, it could
well be made more functional by appropriate modifications. Yet, before we
begin to tamper with parts of the Convention, such as the system of liability, we have to ask the architect's question: Can this particular part be
modified or replaced without damage, or will the whole structure collapse?
In order to determine whether or not Article 20 is a "structural wall" of
the Convention, we therefore must take a look at its original plan.
'W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM: AUTO
COMPENSATION PLANS 36-39 (1965); Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law
Problem: Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 641 (1964); see further discussion infra,
note 31.
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This, I am afraid, requires some historical investigation, and I have to
take you at least as far back as the roaring twenties, and at least as far
away as Paris. For it was Paris where the CITEJA (International Committee of Air Law Experts) was founded' and where it had its headquarters; and Paris, not Warsaw, was the birthplace of most of the legal
concepts that have emerged from this Convention to puzzle posterity.
French Civil Law not only provided the only common language for the
draftsmen, it also dominated the kind of legal reasoning in which most of
them had been brought up. A living incarnation of this undisputed French
predominance was Georges Ripert, the chairman of the Warsaw Conference, and Dean of the Faculty of Law in Paris.
There are cases where the personality of a single man, his individual
opinions and prejudices, can offer more insight into a legal theory than
abstract analysis. I have come to the conclusion that the best key to the
"Warsaw system" of liability is Georges Ripert' and his concept of fault,
which I now propose to consider against the background of French law
at the time when the Warsaw Convention was drafted.
This, I may say, is not at all a strange and inaccessible field for American lawyers today: there are excellent books in English available on this
subject, to which I only have to add some related footnotes. I am referring,
in particular, to Professor Lawson's Negligence in the Civil Law,' and to
Professor von Mehren's Civil Law System, which contains a comprehensive
chapter on the French legal system's reactions to the Industrial Revolution
and to mechanized means of transportation.! To these studies by competent
Anglo-American observers we may now add the masterly translations of
French treatises published by the Louisiana State Law Institute. It is a
rather helpful coincidence that the first major work thus translated into
English is the classic Treatise on the Civil Law by Planiol and Ripert-our
man Ripert, whose hand is quite unmistakable in the chapter dealing with
fault.'
The French concept of fault is laid down in Article 1382, probably one
of the most frequently quoted articles of the Napoleonic Code of 1804:
"Every act whatever of man which causes damage to another obliges him
by whose fault it happened to repair it." While the principle of liability
based on individual fault can be traced to the Lex Aquilia of Roman law,
two factors contributed to entrenching it as a "dogma" in French Civil
Law; the political ideas of the French revolution, and the economic ideas
of laissez-faire-both promoting a concept of individual freedom which
found its necessary correlative in individual responsibility. When the Industrial Revolution generated new hazards, which in France first wrought
judicial exceptions from the dogma as late as 1896, these exceptions were
' Comitj International Technique d'Experts Juridiques Airiens, established by the "First International Conference on Private Air Law" (Paris 1925), and wholly responsible for the drafting
of the Warsaw Convention. See Ide, The History and Accomplishments of the International Technical Committee of Aerial Legal Experts (C.I.T.E.J.A.), 3 J. AIR L. & COM. 27 (1932); Wilberforce, The International Technical Committee of Experts in Air Law, 1 INT'L L.Q. 498 (1947).
aOn the personal influence of French scholars in the pre-war air law conferences, see Sand,
The International Unification of Air Law, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 400, 424 (1965).
'F. LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL LAW (1950).
'A. VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS FOR THE COMPARATIVE
STUDY o LAW 367-414 (1957).
62 M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW, Pt. 1 ,463-535 (1959) (translation
from 11th ed. 1939).
'See F. LAWSON, supra note 4, at 46-50.
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rationalized by the Cour de Cassation by means of a "presumption of
fault" for accidents caused by things under one's care. There was a strong

current of opinion favoring a new kind of liability "for the risk created;"
but by then the fault dogma was too deeply rooted in French scholarly
thinking to be eradicated.' Instead, the conservative reaction against strict
liability gained momentum after the publication of a book entitled The

Moral Rule in Civil Obligations.The author was Georges Ripert, and the
second, most forceful edition of the book appeared in 1927'--during the
drafting stage of the Warsaw Convention.
To Ripert, the judge-invented "presumption of fault"-subsequently

re-christened "presumption of liability,"1 which his opponents had interpreted as a first step towards a general theory of risk, became the magic

device through which the alarming progress of strict liability could be contained within the existing French doctrine of fault. Fault was to be the
basis of all liability; wherever a necessity for strict liability arose, it was
explained away as a case of "presumed fault," sometimes "irrefutably
presumed" or even distinguished as an "obligation .. .not based on the
idea of liability" at all."'
Ripert's dogmatic insistence on fault as the basis for both delictual and
contractual liability prevailed in France," at least until most recently,
when a new vigorous campaign against "the myth of fault" was launched
by Professor Andr6 Tunca But even the more conservative representatives
of French legal scholarship today admit that the concept of "presumed
fault" is merely a doctrinal cover for admitting certain inevitable instances
of strict liability."
The outcome of the Warsaw conference was a personal victory for
Ripert, and he so interpreted it. 1 The "presumption" of Article 20, in
theory at least, preserved his cherished fiction of a brooding omnipresence
of fault in the skies.
The "demonstration effect" of the Convention was such that even those
national legislatures which had previously imposed strict liability on air
' F. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 59-60 (1953)

points out a parallel

reaction of German legal scholars to strict liability "as something statutory and abnormal which
did not conform to the general principle of no liability without fault: it was something that Parliament in its wisdom had chosen to create, but for which the jurists would take no responsibility."
Despite the subsequent acceptance (due to considerable legislative expansion) of strict liability in
Germany, there still is a distinct doctrinal uneasiness about it; see J. ESSER, GRUNDLAGEN UND
ENTWICKLUNG

DER

GEFAEHRDUNGSHAFTUNG

(1941),

and

RINCK,

GEFAEHRDUNGSHAFTUNG

(1959).
' G. RIPERT, LA REGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES (2d ed. 1927).
"oJand'heur v. Les Galeries Belfortaises, Cour de Cassation (Chambres R~unies), [1930] D.P.
I. 57; reprinted in F. LAWSON, supra note 4, at 249, along with the comments of leading French
scholars including Ripert (at 271).
" M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 6, at 467.
" Ever since its decision of 21 November 1911 (SIREY 1912.1.73), the Cour de Cassation has
considered the carrier of passengers to be under a contractual obligation of safe carriage, "in order
to create a system of improved protection for accident victims." 1 H. MAZEAUD & A. TUNG,
TRArrE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE 196 (6th ed. 1965). Although the
passenger thus is not required to prove the carrier's fault, the majority of French writers interpret
this system, again, as a "presumption of fault." See L. CONSTANTINESCO, INEXECUTION ET FAUTE
CONTRACTUELLE

EN

"aA. TUNC, LA

DitOIT COMPARE:

DROITs

SECURITE ROUTIERE 30

FRANCAIS,

ALLEMAND,

ANGLAIs

228

(1960).

(1966).
" Marty, L'expirience franfaise en matiire de responsabilit civile et lesenseignements du Droit
compari, 2 MELANGES MAURY 173, 176 (1960).
"1See Ripert, La Convention de Varsovie du 12 Octobre 1929 et l'unijlcation du droit privi
airien, 57 J. Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL 94 (1930); and Ripert, L'unification du droit airien,
I REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT AERIEN 251 (1932).
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carriers (i.e., Germany) eventually receded to the system of "presumed
fault." Yet the practical effects of this alleged "fault system" on the
carriers' legal position were surprisingly insignificant. It soon became
clear that in cases involving damages not exceeding the Warsaw limits, carriers rarely tried to exonerate themselves. What developed was in fact a
"two-level system of liability:" Below the limits, carriers used to compensate victims without even raising the question of fault-while above the
limits they used to fight, either by direct rebuttal of the presumption via
Article 20, or by reliance on Article 25 (requiring the plaintiff to prove
aggravated fault).
From an "architectural" point of view, then, the "presumption of
fault" was not an essential structural part of the Warsaw Convention,
but rather an element of contemporary legal style underneath which there
emerges a different, though by no means unfamiliar, structure. The twolevel system was the "true rule" of the Warsaw Convention, as opposed
to the "invoked rule" of presumed fault." From this point of view, the
liability system of the Montreal Agreement hardly looks new, let alone
revolutionary. It merely uses plain language where the Warsaw Convention had hesitated to say what it really meant, largely out of deference
to the then dominating French doctrine. The reasons for such linguistic
precaution have disappeared in the meantime, following the decline of
French leadership in the formulation of international air law, and the rise
of English as the new lingua franca in this field. It may be hoped that
the new plain language of the Montreal Agreement will not again be
obscured by yet another dogma of "fault"-this time perhaps out of
deference to the now dominating American doctrine.
III. QuEsTIoN Two
Question No. 2: Does the new system of liability established by the
Montreal Agreement adequately take into account current practices and
trends in aviation accident compensation?
This definitely calls for some "fact research in law," as Nussbaum called
it." For while it may be useful to compare-in the ICAO fashion-the
statutory provisions on air carriers' liability in different countries, national
legislation does not give the total picture. The effective rights and remedies of accident victims do not depend on legislation alone: they are also
affected by the airlines' day-to-day practices of claims settlement and
insurance.
The first group of fact situations where insurance has profoundly

modified the position of air accident victims arises in those European
states where air passengers benefit from a group accident insurance financed, either voluntarily or under government regulations, by the carrier. I have described those systems elsewhere, 9 and at this point only wish
" Compare the German aviation acts of 1922 and 1943, as amended.
17 The terms "true rule vs. rule invoked" have been used by A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE
WITHOUT FAULT (1951) to contrast the strict liability actually applied by American courts with
the 1"negligence language" used to rationalize its application.
sNussbaum, Fact Research in Law, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 189 (1940).
" Sand, Limitation of Liability and Passengers' Accident Compensation Under the Warsaw Convention, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 21 (1962), reprinted in 28 J. AIR L. & CoM. 260 (1962); see also
Sand, Die USA und das Haager Protokoll: Zum Plan einer gesetzlichen Fluggastversicherung,,
12 ZEIT$CRiPT FUE

LUFTRECHT UND WELTRAUMRECHTSFRAGEN

12

(1963).
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to stress one essential element of the typical European "automatic insurance plan:" It permits recovery on the basis of proved damages regardless
of fault -up to a certain limit-while above this limit the plaintiff is free
to resort to the ordinary liability action based on fault, in which case he
will not be allowed to cumulate damages and collateral insurance benefits."0 From the victim's point of view, the effect of this automatic insurance scheme is exactly the same as under a "two-level system of liability:"
guaranteed recovery regardless of fault, up to a limit-and potential recovery based on fault, above the limit.
The second group of situations where the statutory scheme is modified
by compensation practices concerns the Soviet Union and those countries
(such as Bulgaria and Rumania) which closely follow the Soviet system.
A superficial reading of the Soviet Air Code2 creates the impression that
under Soviet law air carriers are under strict liability to passengers, with
no maximum limits whatever. In practice, however, Soviet courts always
limit the victim's compensation to the maximum amounts provided under
the Soviet social security scheme;22 more precisely, to the maximum
amounts that would be due to an employee of the very enterprise which
is liable for the accident."
Recovery in excess of these limits is granted only in cases of criminal
negligence.' The practical result of this Soviet practice, then, also is a
"two-level system:" compensation regardless of fault up to a certain limit
-and possible additional compensation based on aggravated fault.
The third and last group of situations where "the law in the books"
does not accurately reflect the reality of air accident compensation includes
the United States. The theory is that air carriers in this country are liable
only if they are at fault in an accident. But what happens in practice?
If air passenger X can prove that he suffered damages not exceeding
$500, he will almost certainly be refunded by the carrier without any
questions (I am told that most airlines authorize even their lowest sales
agents to pay immediate compensation up to that "petty" amount). If
his proved damages are higher, say $2000, he may have to go somewhat
higher up in the corporate echelons of the airline to get his compensation,
but I am quite sure that he will still get it without a debate on fault, and
even if the accident clearly was due to some fortuitous event. Above that
category, the amounts of compensation become negotiable, and there inevitably comes a point where the airline finally says: "No-that amount
we shall not pay you unless you prove our fault." Where exactly this
20 This is the rule (pro tanto deduction) under the German, Austrian and Swiss "automatic
insurance" plans. The "assurance automatique individuelle" currently operative in France, the
Netherlands and Japan is substantially different, since passengers who wish to take advantage of the
insurance benefits are required to sign a waiver of all liability claims against the carrier; cf. Nishigori, Passengers' Accident Compensation Schemes Under the Warsaw Convention, 62 et seq. (McGill
University Thesis 1966).
"1Effective 1 January 1962; for an English translation see Cooper, Air Code of the U.S.S.R.,
31 J. AIR L. & COM. 22 (1965).
" I V. GsovsKi, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 543 (1948); see also Sand, Die Entwicklung des Luflfahrtrechts in der Sowjetunion, 10 OSTEUROPARECHT 157, 185 (1964), with an English summary
at 206.
"s Following a decision by the Supreme Court of the Russian Socialist Republic of 17 January
1927; see Holman & Spinner, Bases of Liability for Tortious Injury in Soviet Law, 22 IowA L.
REV. 41 (1936). 2 V. GSOVSKI & K. GRZYBOWSKI, GOVERNMENT, LAW AND COURTS IN THE
SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE 1180 (1959).
24 V. GsovsKs, supra note 22, at 545; V. GsovsKI & K. GRZYBOWSKr, supra note 23.
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line is drawn, depends on a number of factual circumstances. But there
can be no doubt that airlines in their compensation practice draw a line
between the amounts they are prepared to pay without arguing about
fault, and the amounts they will only pay if they are found to be at fault.
It is the line between settlement and litigation.
We all know that the so-called "ex-gratia settlements" below that line
are not granted as a matter of grace or benevolence. The strongest incentive for the airlines to compensate passengers without regard to fault is,
of course, their fear of adverse publicity. All litigation that gets into the
news is bad for the air carrier: court decisions against the airline will hurt
its "safety image," court decisions in favor of the airline will hurt its
corporate "friendly image" with the public. As I used to tell some of my
students at the McGill Institute of Air and Space Law, who aspired to
airline careers: If an airline ever hires you as its lawyer, your job will not
be to win victories over widows and orphans in court-your job will be
to keep the courts off the company's neck! The net result of this peculiar
psychological pressure is an extremely high settlement rate (my guess is
somewhere near eighty percent) and a system of liability which comes surprisingly close to the "two-level" model which I have mentioned repeatedly.
Below a certain self-imposed limit, carriers usually grant compensation irrespective of fault (a kind of de facto strict liability) -while above the
limit they will not grant compensation unless the victim can establish
fault.
Between such a de facto system and de jure strict liability there is, however, an important (and, it seems to me, undesirable) difference: This
compensation system operates praeter legem, outside the formal control of
law and courts, handled with wide discretion by claims agents acting for
airlines and insurance companies.
When we now compare the actual compensation process as it operates
in the three groups selected (automatic insurance in Western Europe,
social security in Soviet Russia and ex gratia settlements in the United
States), there emerges a curiously uniform pattern. All three systems
arrive at a dichotomy in practice, which is nowhere reflected in the

formal law. A distinct break separates the level of calculable "standardized" compensation-regardless of fault-from the second level where
additional "individualized" compensation may be obtained upon proof of

fault or aggravated fault. The fact that "two-level systems" thus operate
in so diverse legal environments as Western Europe, Soviet Russia and the
United States, would seem to suggest that the system established by the
Montreal Agreement is realistic.
IV. QUESTION

THREE

Question No. 3: Can a two-level system of liability be upheld in the
light of contemporary legal theory regarding accident compensation? (The
purpose of this final chapter is to place the Montreal Agreement in a
different context; viz., the current discussion on accident compensation
in general, and automobile plans in particular.)
It seems to me that a very significant change has recently taken place

in this field. Most of the older, pre-war plans (such as the Columbia Plan
of the early thirties) took a rather radical New Deal approach. Their
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authors were greatly impressed with the novelty of industrial accidents
and motorization, and their position was usually one of deliberate antithesis to traditional tort law. Contemporary plans (such as the Saskatchewan scheme,25 the proposals by Keeton and O'Connell,1 by Blum and Kalyen,"' or by Tunc in France 21) still regard the traditional system of pure
fault liability as inadequate, but they now recognize certain salient features
of the fault concept. For this "compromise attitude" they have come under
attack themselves, from more radical critics like Calabresi." Yet the discussion has ceased to follow the simple antithesis line of "old fault liability
vs. new strict liability." The psychological arguments in favor of fault
are now taken more seriously; in addition to the primary goal of compensating the victim, new sanctions are sought for the exceptional "blameworthy conduct,"'" "to satisfy indignation;"" and even Calabresi's own
"general deterrence" is largely a psychological substitute for the recognized "preventive" function of fault.
A rather complex synthesis of strict liability and fault liability may
be the most likely result of these trends. As Blum and Kalven put it:
[T]he dominant view among proponents of compensation plans is that the
plans should be what might be called "two-level" . . . .The new view is to
provide an underlying plan that will compensate all victims but only up to
some ceiling level of awards; and to leave the existing fault system alive
while abolishing the collateral benefits rule, under which welfare payments
could not be deducted from damages in tort suits."

I submit that the Montreal Agreement satisfies these theoretical postulates-except for two points that may deserve further deliberation: One
is the collateral benefits rule mentioned by Blum and Kalven, which has
also been subjected to very critical analysis in a recent comparative study
by Professor Fleming;" let me repeat that in the German-Swiss-Austrian
type of automatic air accident insurance the rule is explicitly discarded and
the insurance awards are taken into account if it comes to liability claims
-which seems sensible since it is the carrier who provided the insurance in
the first place. The other point concerns the type of fault to be retained
on the "second level," i.e., above the limits. Even if this is to remain an
exceptional remedy, justifiable only in case of aggravated, negligence-plus
fault (in the sense of gross "criminal negligence," as suggested by Professor Ehrenzweig'), it is arguable whether it ought to be as narrowly
circumscribed as Article 25 in the Warsaw/Hague language. That article
has aptly been described as "the result and the starting point of a comedy
"On

the implications for tort law

seeGREGORY

"R.
KEETON & J. O.'CONNELL, BASIC
W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, supra note

27

& KALVEN, CASES ON TORTS 757-60 (1959).
PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 273 (1965).

1.

28 A. TUNC, supra note 13, and Tune, Traffic Accident Compensation in France: The Present
Law and a ControversialProposal, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1966).

" Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78
HARv. L. REV. 713 (1965); Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and
Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216 (1965).
'"A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 17, as reprinted in 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1422, 1476 (1966).
" Blum & Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calebresi: Auto Accidents and General Deter-

rence,
34 U. CHI. L. REv. 239, 270-72 (1967).
2
Id. at 266-67.
'Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. L. REv.
1478 (1966).
4 A. EHRENZWEIG, "FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1954).
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of errors"5s--besides having been the subject of an intolerable amount of
quid pro quo trading--and should not tie the hands of future draftsmen.
Having said that much about the role of fault on the individualized
"second level" of compensation, let me emphasize again that the principal
merit of the Montreal Agreement is its outright acceptance of standardized
automatic compensation irrespective of fault on the "first level," which
comprises the great bulk of air accidents. It is here where the present
system was in need of substantial improvement. I can see the point in a
highly specialized lawyer fighting a top-damage case of gross negligence,
on a reasonable contingent-fee basis if need be. But I can see absolutely no
point in tort litigation over the average aviation accident damage. The
social and individual losses caused by an air crash are bad enough by
themselves-they do not have to be multiplied by the unnecessary costs
of a litigation process that burdens the victims, the airlines and the courts,
does not contribute anything to the investigation and prevention of aircraft accidents, 7 and benefits no one except a parasitic section of the legal
profession.
"The tremendous wastes of human energy and resources which are involved in the existing tort solution" 3s-this is what reminded me of the
African story I told you in the beginning. When I hear somebody arguing the "free fault" dogma for aviation accidents, I think of how that
Ethiopian village holds an "afersata" investigation in order to pay for its
community expenses, and I forget to smile. Just remember those African
villagers sitting under their tree for a full working-day, stubbornly pretending to find a culprit for a tort which they know there is really no one
to blame. In a recent study, Professor Tunc of Paris came to the devastating conclusion that neither the French nor the English law of traffic
accident compensation today could seriously be offered as a model to the
new African states that are currently drafting their own laws.' I do not
know whether anyone among you is prepared to offer them the present
American model instead. I do believe, however, that the two-level liability,
which is at the heart of the Montreal Agreement, could be worked into a
viable new system that can serve the same model function in the future
as the old Warsaw Convention has in the past.

" H. DstRto, LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 170 (1954).
36On the 1955 bargaining see Calkins, Hiking the Limits of Liability at The Hague, 56 PROCEEDING AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 120 (1962).

7 On the contrary, there are strong indications that the vital expediency and honesty of tech-

nical aircraft accident investigations tends to suffer from the prospect of legal implications. See
Aircraft Accident Investigations: A Study in Comparative Administrative Law, McGill University
Joint Research Project No. 4 (Sand ed. 1964).
38Lang, Compensation of Victims: A Pious and Misleading Platitude, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1559
(1966); cf. Jean Carbonnier (as quoted by TUNC, supra note 13: "Un immense gaspillage d'intelligence et de temps, c'est peut-etre le bilan qu'on dressera un jour de n6tre c~lkbre jurisprudence."
a Tunc, The Twentieth Century Development and Function of the Law of Torts in France, 14
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1089, 1102 (1965).

